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INTRODUCTION 
[1] As a general rule, companies and government agencies should plan for 
preservation and production before litigation is probable. This means having a 
document retention program.1 These programs ensure that documents are retained 
or deleted in an orderly fashion.2 If a company properly follows its policies and 
procedures, this retention program acts as a “shield” against the incomplete 
preservation of relevant (or “hot”) documents deleted before the proper initiation 
 
                                                                                                                                     
∗ David W. Degnan is an Associate with KOELLER, NEBEKER, CARLSON AND HALUCK, LLP in 
Phoenix Arizona.  
1 See Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1410, 1411–13 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding that 
Harvard’s complex records management system was sufficient to show that sanctions were not 
necessary for accidental destruction of relevant evidence by a third party).  
2 See Working Group on Elec. Document Retention & Prod., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona 
Conference Commentary on Email Management: Guidelines for the Selection of Retention Policy, 
8 SEDONA CONF. J. 239, 240 (2007) available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ 
dltForm?did=Commentary_on_Email_Management___revised_cover.pdf [hereinafter E-mail 
Management];  WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS &, PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 11 cmt. 1.a (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2007) available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=2007Summaryof 
SedonaPrinciples2ndEditionAug17assentforWG1.pdf [hereinafter THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES]. 
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of a litigation hold.3 If parties do not follow, or inconsistently follow, such a 
program, they might have to explain what happened to a missing relevant 
document. Thus, a retention program might act as a “sword,” allowing an 
opposing party to claim that the company’s preservation was not complete.4 
Indeed, having a haphazard document retention program is probably worse than 
not having a retention program at all.5 
[2] But once a party is sued or a critical threat of litigation is reached,6 the 
document retention policies and procedures must be placed on hold to preserve 
relevant documents and tangible evidence for trial.7 At such a point, counsel has 
an affirmative duty to preserve relevant information that might lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.8 This preservation process can become very 
expensive.9 To that end, clarification is needed about what electronically stored 
information (ESI) and in-house counsel’s duties are throughout pre-trial litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
3 See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 750–51 (8th Cir. 2004); Healthcare 
Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
4 See Swofford v. Eslinger, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2009). See generally Mikron 
Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-532RSL, 2008 WL 1805727, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 21, 2008) (finding that the defendant failed to provide the court with proof of a 
document retention program); Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 127 (S.D. 
Fla. 1987) (finding that the defendant willfully destroyed documents). The sword and shield 
analogy is most eloquently phrased in SHIRA SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 33–35 (2009). 
5 See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 615 (D.N.J. 1997) 
(drawing an adverse inference that destroyed documents were relevant).  
6 See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the “obligation to 
preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation—most 
commonly when suit has been filed”). 
7 See Zubulake v. U.B.S. Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(stating that a litigant “is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is 
relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is 
reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is subject of a pending discovery 
request”). 
8 See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 281 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
9 See generally David W. Degnan, Seven Questions (and Some Answers) on Electronic Discovery, 
PRETRIAL PRAC. & DISCOVERY NEWSLETTER (A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Chicago, Il.), Spring 2008, at 8 
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[3] In perhaps the first case of its kind, Swofford v. Eslinger10 presents an 
exemplar of why clarification is needed in every jurisdiction. The Swofford court 
imposed pecuniary sanctions for discovery abuses against in-house counsel but 
not the counsel of record.11 The court found that the failure to preserve tangible 
and electronic evidence was inexcusable and merited monetary sanctions and 
adverse inferences.12 This decision is troublesome for in-house counsel and 
necessitates a fundamental shift in the power structure in big cases between in-
house counsel, ESI counsel, and trial counsel. 
[4] This article provides a roadmap for ESI and in-house counsel to prevent 
spoliation sanctions and to ensure that the case is decided on the merits rather than 
by discovery sanctions. Part I of this article takes a detailed look at Swofford v. 
Eslinger, reviewing preservation problems in the case and the spoliation ruling. 
Part II addresses what steps should be taken to create a defensible preservation 
effort. Part III investigates the steps necessary to provide a reasonable production 
to the opposing party. Part IV highlights the importance of cooperation among 
counsel.  
I.  SWOFFORD V. ESLINGER 
[5] Swofford presents a textbook situation of electronic discovery taking over 
a case.13 Swofford was a negligence case stemming from a police shooting.14 
Although the amount of evidence created from such an event should be relatively 
 
                                                                                                                                     
available at www.abanet.org/litigation/mo/premium-lt/newsletters/pretrial/pretrial_spring2008.pdf 
(providing some examples of how much electronic discovery costs).  
10 671 F. Supp. 2d. 1274. 
11 See id. at 1287–88. 
12 See id. at 1278, 1289. 
13 See generally Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1274. 
14 See id. at 1277–78. 
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small,15 it was three years after discovery began that the court reached the 
sanctions discussed in this article.16  
A.  Background: Officers Shoot a Home Owner 
[6] The facts of this case are relatively straightforward.17 A car was stolen on 
April 20, 2006 in Seminole County, Florida.18 At the time of the theft, Seminole 
County Sheriff’s Deputy Ronald Remus was in the area and pursued two 
suspects.19 Unsuccessful in his pursuit, Remus returned to the scene of the crime 
and, with the help of the K-9 unit and Deputy William Morris Jr.,20 searched the 
apartment complex and around adjacent homes.21 Robert Swofford, the owner of 
one of the adjacent homes, came out of his house with a weapon drawn.22 When 
the deputies saw that Swofford was armed, they shot him seven times.23 Swofford 
survived but was confined to a hospital bed for six weeks.24 
[7] After recovering from the shooting, Swofford filed suit in federal court 
against the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO), Sheriff Donald Eslinger, 
and others, alleging excessive force and improper entry onto his property.25 
 
                                                                                                                                     
15 See id. at 1278 (noting that the document requests only asked for the preservation of e-mails, 
electronic evidence, and certain tangible evidence). 
16 See id. at 1278. 
17 See generally id. at 1277–78.  
18 Id. at 1277. 
19 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-78. 
24 Id. at 1278. 
25 Id. at 1277. 
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Further, Swofford asserted several state law claims, including “battery, gross 
negligence, simple negligence, and negligent training and supervision.”26  
[8] After filing suit, Swofford requested that the defendants preserve relevant 
tangible and electronic evidence for trial.27 Specifically, Swofford sought Remus’ 
laptop computer; all internal e-mails for the 14 months following the incident; and 
the deputies’ radios, guns, and uniforms used on the night of April 20, 2006.28 
B.  Preservation Problems: Preservation Requires  
More than Sending a Letter to Key Players 
[9] Swofford’s counsel requested by letter, dated August 24, 2006, that “all 
evidence in the SCSO’s possession related to the shooting be maintained in its 
original order.”29 Swofford’s counsel followed up with a second letter on 
February 6, 2007,30 asking SCSO’s counsel for additional evidence, “including 
firearms, clips and ammunition, training records, and electronic evidence.”31 
Swofford’s counsel also made public records requests for e-mail communications 
regarding the incident.32  
[10] The SCSO acknowledged that it received these preservation and notice 
letters, but its general counsel, David Lane, noted that it “never issued any 
directives or litigation hold memos to suspend all orders, practices, or policies that 
could lead to the destruction of evidence . . . .”33 In fact, the SCSO’s General 
Counsel noted that “the only action taken by anyone . . . in response to the 
preservation letters was that . . . a paralegal in the General Counsel’s office, 
reviewed the letters and forwarded a copy of the letters to approximately six 
 
                                                                                                                                     
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1278. 
28 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1278. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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senior SCSO employees, including Sheriff Eslinger.”34 The second letter from 
Swofford’s counsel was also sent to several other officers, including the 
department’s Captain of Professional Standards.35 
[11] According to the General Counsel, distributing the preservation letters to 
SCSO key employees would “cover the course and scope of the evidence 
requested in the first letter and in the second letter,” and that “nothing further 
needed to be done.”36 Morris and Remus, however, did not receive any 
preservation instructions related to the incident.37 Moreover, after the preservation 
requests were forwarded, none of the department’s employees preserved any 
relevant evidence.38 Indeed, the General Counsel failed to do anything “to ensure 
that SCSO employees were properly complying with the preservation letters.”39 
[12] The Swofford court found that “it is no defense to suggest . . . that 
particular employees were not on notice.”40 “The obligation to retain discoverable 
materials is an affirmative one; it requires that the agency or corporate officers 
having notice of discovery obligations communicate those obligations to 
employees in possession of discoverable materials.”41 Applying this standard, the 
court reviewed the failure of the SCSO to suspend or bar destruction procedures 
and determined whether all the evidence was properly preserved after Swofford’s 
requests were made.42 Based on the evidence, including the defense counsel’s 
admission of wrongdoing, the court imposed sanctions.43 
 
                                                                                                                                     
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1279. 
37 Id. 
38 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. (citing Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).  
41 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (citing Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 73)). 
42 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
43 Id. at 1282.  
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C.  Spoliation Standard: It Is Bad Faith for Counsel To Not Oversee the 
Preservation of Relevant Documents 
[13] The court noted that it may impose sanctions by its own inherent authority 
or where certain elements are satisfied.44 In the Eleventh Circuit, the elements for 
a spoliation claim are: 
(1) the existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or 
contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the 
potential civil action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) 
significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a 
causal relationship between the evidence destruction and the 
inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages.45 
The Eleventh Circuit also incorporates a bad faith element, requiring more than 
mere negligence to sustain an adverse inference instruction.46 The court went on 
to define the factors to be considered in determining the sanctions to be imposed 
against a party failing to preserve pertinent evidence.47 Those factors are: “(1) the 
willfulness or bad faith of the party responsible for the loss or destruction of the 
evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice sustained by the opposing party; and (3) 
what is required to cure the prejudice.”48 
[14] The Swofford court held that the defendants acted in bad faith by failing to 
take affirmative steps to ensure compliance with the preservation letter and failing 
to understand their duties with respect to the preservation of such evidence.49 
Moreover, the court reasoned that the parties who received the preservation letters 
failed to preserve the specified evidence.50 For example, the guns used in the 
 
                                                                                                                                     
44 See id. at 1280.  
45 Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).  
46 See Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.  
47 See id.  
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 1281. 
50 See id. (“[S]enior SCSO officials who received the letters . . . completely disregarded the letters 
and their resultant legal obligations.”). 
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incident were dismembered, and the uniforms worn by the deputies were 
destroyed.51 In fact, the court found no evidence that the defendants or their 
counsel complied with the preservation obligations.52 Therefore, given the 
defendants’ “knowing and willful disregard for the clear obligation to preserve 
evidence that was solely within [their] possession and control,” the court found 
that bad faith was “clear” and resulted in substantial prejudice to Swofford.53 
Accordingly, the court imposed several adverse inferences.54 
[15] Interestingly, the court also issued sanctions against the company’s 
General Counsel.55 The court imposed fees and costs against him “in light of his 
complete failure to fulfill his duty . . . as General Counsel for SCSO and as initial 
counsel for all Defendants . . . .”56 Additionally, the court found the General 
Counsel liable for failing “to take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that 
all relevant, discoverable information is identified, retained and produced.”57 
D.  Commentary: Swofford’s Effects 
[16] Commentators have been swift to provide feedback about this case. Ralph 
Losey, an acclaimed e-discovery blogger, compared the role of in-house counsel 
to the Wizard of Oz.58 Effectively, Swofford “pulls aside the curtain,” exposing 
the in-house counsel to liability.59 Losey notes: “Judges from now on may not be 
satisfied with the Wizard attorney of record, they may look for the ‘man behind 
 
                                                                                                                                     
51 See Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87. 
52 See id. at 1283. 
53 Id. at 1282. 
54 See id. at 1289.  
55 See id. at 1287–88. 
56 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
57 Id. at 1287–88. 
58 See In-House Counsel Sanctioned for Defendant’s Failure to Preserve Evidence, E-DISCOVERY 
TEAM, Nov. 1, 2009, http://e-discoveryteam.com/2009/11/01/in-house-counsel-sanctioned-for-
defendants-failure-to-preserve-evidence/. 
59 See id.  
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the curtain,’ the in-house counsel pulling all the levers.”60 Consequently, Losey 
warns that “[i]n-house counsel should beware. They are not safe behind the 
curtain of non-appearance. They too are exposed to sanctions, just like their 
counsel of record, if they are not diligent in the responsibilities they assume.”61 
[17] The ramifications of the Swofford opinion made waves through the legal 
community. In fact, Benjamin Wright, another prolific blogger, noted: “Many 
veteran lawyers will be astonished to hear that a federal judge sanctioned an in-
house government lawyer for taking something less than vigorous steps to cause 
and monitor the preservation of electronic evidence.”62 Wright explains that the 
Swofford decision requires lawyers to understand the ephemeral nature of ESI and 
be especially vigilant “to preserve it under a litigation hold.”63 
[18] These two views, coupled with the Swofford opinion itself, suggest that 
more guidance is needed. To ensure a transparent preservation of relevant 
documents, counsel need to understand and to plan scrupulously for discovery in 
a manner that will ensure future compliance and understand that it must supervise 
its employees and all nonlawyers that it enlists to help it with discovery.64 The 
time to plan, therefore, is well before the first complaint is filed, well before the 
first summons is issued, and well before the initial conflict arises. 
II.  DEFENSIBLE PRESERVATION 
[19] The Swofford case has received significant press coverage for reasons that 
are not readily apparent. Swofford demonstrates the need for counsel to 
understand discovery requirements and plan proactively for e-discovery disputes. 
Doing so helps counsel and client save face, time, and money during e-discovery. 
The next two sections propose certain steps for developing a reasonable 
 
                                                                                                                                     
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Treat Electronic Records the Same as Paper Records?, ELEC. DATA RECORDS LAW I HOW TO 
WIN E-DISCOVERY, Nov. 2, 2009, http://legal-beagle.typepad.com/wrights_legal_beagle/2009/11/ 
records-policy html. 
63 See id.  
64 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 432–433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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preservation strategy that will allow cases to proceed to trial rather than to 
excessive discovery motions and sanctions. 
A.  Companies Should Have, and Follow, a Document Retention Program. 
[20] A document retention program provides a uniform set of practices for how 
long a company keeps or destroys its documents.65 Each retention program is 
different and must meet the individual demands of that company, while 
considering existing statutory and regulatory preservation obligations particular to 
each industry.66 For example, although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might require a 
financial institution to keep financial records for a number of years, such 
obligations probably are not an issue with a privately owned car company.67 But 
there are some common features and benefits of a well-founded and transparent 
retention program. 
[21] Typically, a document retention program must address electronic 
communications, which is not limited to e-mail.68 Common features of a retention 
program include a limitation on the amount of e-mail storage space available to 
each user;69 the automatic deletion of e-mails retained for a certain period of 
time;70 a usage restraint, preventing the user from transferring documents onto 
their personal computer;71 and a mandatory storage folder to keep privileged or 
statutorily required documents.72 Initiating such measures, if nothing else, allows 
 
                                                                                                                                     
65 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (“Document retention 
policies, which are created in part to keep certain information from getting into the hands of 
others, including the Government, are common in business.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
66 See E-mail Management, supra note 2, at 239–40.  
67 See id. at 240; Posting of Sarah D. Scalet to CSO Online, http://www.csoonline.com/article/ 
220939/The_Seven_Deadly_Sins_of_Records_Retention?page=1 (July 1, 2006). 
68 See generally E-mail Management, supra note 2, at 240.  
69 See id.  
70 See id. at 241.  
71 See id. at 242.  
72 See id. at 241–42. 
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a company to know exactly where its documents are and to explain the deletion of 
any given document. 
[22] The benefits of implementing a document retention program are 
numerous. It prevents counsel from preserving “every shred of evidence.”73 It 
ensures that documents have a reasonable shelf life and are deleted when they are 
no longer needed.74 It decreases the amount of work for document reviewers.75 It 
prevents some spoliation motions for failure to produce relevant evidence.76 And 
to the cynical at heart, it thwarts the preservation of “hot” documents if those 
documents are automatically deleted as part of the company’s retention policy.77 
For instance, in Southeastern Mechanical Services v. Brody,78 the Middle District 
of Florida held that sanctions are inappropriate, absent a showing of bad faith, 
where a “hot” document is destroyed after litigation is anticipated but before the 
proper initiation of a litigation hold.79 
[23] But a retention program is beneficial only if it is scrupulously followed.80 
Following a retention program requires constant oversight and supervision by 
 
                                                                                                                                     
73
See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217.  
74 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 12 cmt. 1.b.  
75 See Indexing Digital Documents--It’s NOT an Option Pay Now or Pay (More) Later, 
http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~scisco/inel.html 
76 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 12 cmt. 1.b.  
77 Compare THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 12–13 cmt. 1.b (noting that there are several 
benefits of an organized document retention program), with Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 
F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that one of the elements to determine the reasonableness 
of a document retention policy is bad faith; therefore, the policy should not be written for the sole 
purpose of deleting “hot” documents).  
78 No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69830, at *13 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009). 
79 See id. But see Broccoli v. Echostar, 229 F.R.D. 506, 512 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing the 
correlation between bad faith and a finding of spoliation).  
80 See Gippetti v. UPS, Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 2008 WL 3264483, at *1, 4 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 6, 2008) (allowing a defendant to successfully defend its destruction of relevant evidence by 
showing it had a document retention program since 2002); see Sarah D. Scalet, The Seven Deadly 
Sins of Records Retention, CSO ONLINE, July 1, 2006, http://www.csoonline.com/article/220939/ 
The_Seven_Deadly_Sins_of_Records_ Retention?page=1. 
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both in-house and ESI counsel.81 Moreover, with organizations that are constantly 
in litigation, counsel should meet with IT personnel for a briefing on “the relevant 
technology and storage architecture,”82 and notify these personnel of the 
company’s affirmative duty to make them available for depositions on the 
subject.83 The Sedona Conference recommends asking questions regarding the 
storage of the company’s e-mail, determining the company’s consistency of 
checking or overseeing its document retention program, and identifying who at 
the company is responsible for ensuring compliance.84 Asking questions like these 
provides counsel with the information necessary to locate relevant documents and 
set up a suitable document retention program.85  
[24] More importantly, a document retention program must be consistent with 
a company’s needs and expectations.86 For several reasons, it is better for a 
company to change the policies or procedures of its document retention program 
than to fail to meet the lofty goals or ideals outlined in the program.87 If a 
company decides to change its policies, however, it should anticipate the costs 
associated with such a change, including any costs for training employees how to 
manage the company’s records.88 Although the Swofford court considered 
SCSO’s document retention program only in passing, the general rule is that 
litigation holds should always be discussed in the context of the document 
retention program.89  
 
                                                                                                                                     
81 See Newman v. Borders, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing the plaintiff’s 
argument that the defendant did not produce someone knowledgeable of its document retention 
program). 
82 See E-mail Management, supra note 2, at 244. 
83 See Heartland Surgical Specialty Hospital v. Midwest Div., Inc., 2007 WL 1054279, at *7 (D. 
Kan. Apr. 9, 2007) (finding that the corporation had an “affirmative duty to produce a 
representative who can answer questions . . . known or reasonably available.”). 
84 See id. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 244.  
85 See id. at 243–44. 
86 See Scalet, supra note 80. 
87 See generally id.  
88 See E-mail Management, supra note 2, at 247–48. 
89 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1280–81. 
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B.  Preparing for a Litigation Hold Is Complex: Develop a Plan 
[25] Once a party is sued or has reasonable facts to know that it will be sued, 
counsel has an affirmative duty to put its document retention program on hold and 
start saving its relevant documents.90 The duty to preserve may arise from some 
harm or injury, a statute, or a parallel agency proceeding.91 A litigation hold is a 
multi-faceted (and sometimes very expensive) process that requires the effort of 
multiple parties working together.92 To ensure compliance on such a measure, it 
takes support from the team of attorneys, employees and reviewers.93 Employees 
must review all documents, retaining those relevant to the litigation hold. Counsel 
must provide oversight and conduct a reasonable investigation into whether all 
relevant documents are being retained. These steps require “back-up” measures to 
ensure a defensible position and rely on counsel taking control of the discovery 
process.94 
[26] A team approach improves the execution of litigation holds and 
organization of other discovery measures.95 There should be a meeting where 
members of the IT, legal, financial, and records management departments are 
briefed on their responsibilities with respect to the litigation hold.96 In turn, those 
 
                                                                                                                                     
90 Cache la Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 630 (D. Colo. 2007) 
(“Counsel retains an on-going responsibility to take appropriate measures to ensure that the client 
has provided all available information and documents which are responsive to discovery 
requests.”); Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“It is not sufficient to notify all 
employees of a litigation hold and expect that the party will retain and produce all information. 
Counsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable 
information are identified and searched.”). 
91 See E-mail Management, supra note 2, at 240. 
92 See WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS: THE TRIGGER & THE PROCESS 11 
(Conor R. Crowley et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter LEGAL HOLDS]. 
93 See id. 
94 See Wignut Films Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp, No. CV 05-1516-RSWL, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 72953, at *55 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (“Counsel must make a reasonable investigation 
and effort to certify that the client has provided all information and documents available which are 
responsive to the discovery request.”).  
95 See LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 92, at 11.  
96 See id. 
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individuals will be able to provide additional oversight of their respective 
department’s compliance with the hold.97 Moreover, by bringing the team 
together, the client and ESI counsel can discuss possible search terms, address the 
claims or defenses, identify where such documents would be located, and 
determine how the records are stored.98  
[27] Once a team is in place, counsel should complete several steps to ensure 
compliance or a transparent position. This requires drafting a notice regarding the 
litigation hold.99 Counsel should also have employees certify that they received 
the litigation hold notice, understood the notice, and took all necessary steps to 
implement the provisions in the notice.100 Taking these steps ensures that counsel 
has a transparent and defensible position whether or not opposing counsel or the 
court challenges its preservation measures.101 
[28] In-house or ESI counsel must also take control of the discovery process 
and the scope of litigation before the trial counsel becomes involved.102 The in-
house or ESI attorney has several affirmative duties to ensure compliance with e-
discovery rules.103 The issuance of a litigation hold is the first responsibility.104 It 
should be done at the outset of litigation or where litigation is reasonably 
anticipated.105 Any threat of litigation, however, should be unequivocal.106 
 
                                                                                                                                     
97 See id.  
98 Id.  
99 See SCHEINDLIN, supra note 4, at, 67.  
100 See id. at 71. 
101 See id.  
102 Mary Mack et al., Effective Management of Litigation Holds, ACC DOCKET, 36, 40 (May 
2009). 
103 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432 (stating that counsel must ensure that “all sources of potentially 
relevant evidence are placed on hold. . . . To do this, counsel must become fully familiar with her 
client’s document retention policies, as well as the client’s data retention architecture.”); 
SCHEINDLIN, supra note 4, at 37–38.  
104 See id. at 37. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 4. 
105 LEGAL HOLD at 1. Texas v. City of Frisco, 2008 WL 828055 (E.D. Tex March 27, 2008) 
(finding the mere threat of litigation was not enough to initiate a litigation hold). See Kenneth J. 
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[29] The Sedona Conference, a non-profit think tank, set forth several factors 
to consider in determining whether litigation should be “reasonably anticipated,” 
including:107  
The nature and specificity of the complaint or threat; [t]he party 
making the claim; [t]he position of the party making the claim; 
[t]he business relationship between the accused and accusing 
parties; [w]hether the threat is direct, implied or inferred; [w]hether 
the party making the claim is known to be aggressive or litigious; 
[w]hether a party who could assert a claim is aware of the claim; 
[t]he strength, scope, or value of a potential claim; [t]he likelihood 
that data relating to a claim will be lost or destroyed; [t]he 
significance of the data to the known or reasonably anticipated 
issues; [w]hether the company has learned of similar claims; [t]he 
experience of the industry; [w]hether the relevant records are being 
retained for some other reason; and [p]ress and[/]or industry 
coverage of the issue either directly pertaining to the client, or of 
complaints brought against someone similarly situated in the 
industry.108  
These factors should be considered in light of the facts known by counsel when 
contemplating whether to issue a litigation hold.109 
[30] A litigation hold ensures that a company preserves relevant information.110 
According to the Sedona Conference, there should be an attempt to narrow the 
scope of the litigation hold to filter out irrelevant data,111 and to lower the cost and 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Withers, “Ephemeral Data” and the Duty to Preserve Discoverable Electronically Stored 
Information, 37 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 349, 349–50 (2008).  
106 See generally Hynix Semiconductor v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (discussing various standards for the foreseeability of litigation). 
107 See LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 92, at 9. 
108 Id. at 11. 
109 Id. at 9–10. 
110 See generally id. at 12. 
111 Id.  
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the time spent in e-discovery disputes.112 This might require indexing the 
documents by category or using software to conduct an initial review of the 
documents and remove duplicative and irrelevant data.113 
[31] In Swofford, the court did not consider any of the factors suggested by the 
Sedona Conference.114 But the court did not need to undertake such an intensive 
analysis because counsel did not take the affirmative steps that are required to 
ensure that the litigation hold was followed.115 When an officer enters someone’s 
property and shoots them, litigation should be “reasonably anticipated.” As such, 
there is a duty to preserve documents relevant to the incident.116 Nevertheless, in 
Swofford, counsel failed to take the affirmative steps necessary to ensure that the 
SCSO complied with the litigation hold.117  
C.  Drawing the Line: A Party Need Not Produce more than Is Asked for 
[32] Where litigation is pending or reasonably foreseeable, a party should 
preserve and identify potential evidence for the use of others to prove relevant 
claims or defenses.118 This is not to say, however, that parties are obligated to 
preserve every shred of relevant evidence.119 First and foremost, courts review the 
particulars of the preservation request to determine what the parties are asking the 
court to do.120 
[33] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to request the 
preservation of any documents or information related to a claim or defense,121 but 
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113 Id.  
114 See Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.  
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the scope of preservation is limited.122 For example, the producing party need not 
preserve documents if doing so would be cumulative, unduly burdensome, or 
prohibitively costly.123 A court also has discretion to set forth a preservation order 
from which the both parties can rely upon to move the case forward.124  
[34] On the one hand, where a court, prompted by a motion from the producing 
party, deems a preservation request too broad, it may intervene and limit the 
scope of the preservation.125 On the other hand, where a request is deemed too 
narrow, courts generally will not issue a broader preservation order.126 For 
example, in Newman v. Borders, the defendant moved the court to order the 
plaintiff to provide someone knowledgeable of its e-mail system for deposition.127 
In ruling against the defendant, the court stated that the deposition notice failed to 
include “e-mail” or “electronically stored information” as potential topics for 
questioning.128 
[35] Curiously, the Swofford court considered a deputy’s “less than candid” 
testimony regarding a conversation he held via instant messaging (an ephemeral 
or fleeting medium) in considering whether sanctions were warranted.129 Unlike 
the plaintiff in Newman, the plaintiff in Swofford specifically asked for e-mails in 
his first request for production of documents and other electronic evidence in his 
second request for production of documents.130 In light of the lack of preservation 
efforts and the deputy’s testimony, the Swofford court authorized an adverse 
 
                                                                                                                                     
122 Id.; see, e.g., Computek Computer & Office Supplies, Inc. v. Walton, 156 S.W. 3d 217 (Tex. 
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123 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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126 See, e.g., Newman v. Borders, Inc., et al., 257 F.R.D. 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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inference regarding the contents of e-mails deleted from the defendant’s 
computer.131 
D.  Ephemeral Data: Do I Really Have To Preserve Fleeting Technology? 
[36] Ephemeral or transient data refers to data that are fleeting—kept for only a 
short period of time and not retained on a computer.132 Common examples 
include unsaved instant message conversations, information stored in Random 
Access Memory (RAM), and temporary files momentarily stored in a computer’s 
cache.133  
[37] In Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell,134 a district court addressed whether 
Server Log Data temporarily stored on a computer was discoverable.135 The court 
ordered the defendant to produce the Server Log Data, but permitted the redaction 
of computer Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.136 Relying upon judicial precedent 
and Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and its advisory committee 
notes, the Columbia Pictures court reasoned that IP addresses that are “fixed” or 
temporarily stored in RAM are electronically stored information.137 In a footnote, 
however, the Columbia Pictures court noted that its holding was narrow, stating 
that it ordered production of the ephemeral data only because it was unique and 
directly on point to the ongoing litigation.138  
 
                                                                                                                                     
131 Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. 
132 See Withers, supra note 105, at 360–363.  
133 See id.  
134 No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
135 Id. at *1 & n.3.  
136 Id. at *14. 
137 Id. at *4–5 (citing MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
138 Id. at *13 n.31 (“The court emphasizes that its ruling should not be read to require litigants in 
all cases to preserve and produce electronically stored information that is temporary stored only in 
RAM. The court’s decision in this case . . . is based in significant part on the nature of this case, 
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[38] Other courts, however, have held that ephemeral data are not 
discoverable.139 In Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were liable for failing to copy or 
otherwise preserve information temporarily stored in cache files.140 Applying a 
retrospective analysis, the court disagreed, reasoning that the plaintiffs made no 
effort to destroy the information because the cache files were automatically 
deleted.141 Similarly, in Convolve v. Compaq, a district court held that information 
contained on oscilloscope readings was too fleeting to preserve.142  
[39] Columbia Pictures, Healthcare Advocates, and Convolve all declined to 
issue sanctions for the failure to preserve ephemeral data.143 But the Swofford 
court abandoned such reasoning.144 It found an adverse inference was appropriate 
for failing to preserve computer files pertaining to instant message 
conversations.145 Such consideration of instant messages for discovery is 
uncommon.146 As such, the Swofford court’s decision is curious (especially given 
that the plaintiff made a generic request for the preservation of “electronic 
evidence”).147  
 
                                                                                                                                     
139 See generally Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 
2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Convolve v. Compaq, 223 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y 2004). 
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142 See Convolve, 223 F.R.D. at 177.  
143 See Healthcare Advocates, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 641; Columbia Pictures, 2007 WL 2080419 at 
*1; Convolve, 223 F.R.D. at 169.  
144 See Swofford, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1282–84. 
145 Id. at 1284. 
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E.  Sanctions Are Not Common Against In-house or ESI Counsel. 
[40] Typically, courts order sanctions against a party or its counsel of record 
pursuant to Rules 26(g) and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.148 Courts 
have long held that counsel’s failure to oversee discovery merits sanctions.149 The 
Qualcomm v. Broadcom case provides an example of when sanctions are 
appropriate. The Qualcomm court sanctioned a corporate plaintiff over 
$8,500,000 for failing to produce 46,000 relevant e-mails and misrepresenting to 
the court that such e-mails did not exist.150 For those same reasons, the court 
referred six members of Qualcomm’s outside counsel team to the State Bar of 
California for investigation of possible ethical violations and ordered them to take 
a remedial course.151 And although subsequent rulings in this case have declined 
to issue bad faith sanctions against the attorneys,152 the lesson from Qualcomm 
remains: “Outside counsel, at all levels of authority, who rely on a client’s search 
and retrieval of electronically stored information, are obligated to ask probing 
questions, audit the search and retrieval, and confirm that all potential sources of 
information have been investigated.”153  
[41] Courts rarely sanction someone other than the counsel of record or a 
named party for discovery abuses. In Swofford, the SGSO’s in-house counsel, 
failed to reasonably abide by the rules for e-discovery.154 The Swofford court 
sanctioned the general counsel because he ignored a preservation request, he 
 
                                                                                                                                     
148 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
149 See Gregory D. Shelton, Qualcomm v. Broadcom: Lessons for Counsel and a Roadmap for E-
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represented the defendants, and he failed to take steps to preserve any evidence.155 
Therefore, the court found that he was liable for such discovery abuses. 
[42] Similarly, courts rarely sanction parties for the actions of non-parties.156 
For instance, in Independent Productions Corp. v. Lowe’s Inc.,157 two corporate 
officers retired to avoid discovery obligations.158 Notwithstanding their 
retirement, the court sanctioned the corporation, finding that the former officers 
remained its “managing agents.”159 Likewise, applying an “alter ego” variant of 
the “managing agent” theory, the Seventh Circuit, in Margoles v. Johns,160 
sanctioned a father for his son’s failure to meet discovery demands (even though 
his son was not a party to the litigation).161 Given the holding in Swofford, courts 
might be more inclined to sanction in-house counsel for the same types of 
discovery abuses. 
F.  Life After Swofford 
[43] Swofford will affect how in-house and ESI counsel manage big cases. 
Given the numerous forms of electronic media and the increasing use of 
technology in everyday life, the duty to preserve relevant documents is difficult 
under the best of circumstances and impossible under the worst. Swofford will 
almost assuredly place more of a burden (and more risk) on ESI counsel. 
Certainly, where the counsel of record can avoid participating in document 
preservation, he or she will not want to take the monetary and professional risk of 
wrongly conducting e-discovery. Therefore, in-house and ESI counsel will likely 
become more popular in the coming weeks, months, and years. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
155 Id. at 1287–1288 n.8 (“The Court imposes sanctions against Mr. Lane pursuant to both the 
Court’s inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.”). 
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III.  DEFENSIBLE PRODUCTION 
[44] Properly preserving relevant evidence for trial is just the beginning.162 
Counsel must undertake several steps to ensure an effective document review and 
satisfactory production of relevant documents to the opposing party.163 This 
section addresses the importance of holding a “meet and confer” conference, 
outlining what steps must be taken to select and review relevant documents, and 
explaining how to properly produce documents to the opposing party. 
A.  Meet and Confer Conference:  
Use It—It Will Help You Advance Your Case. 
[45] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) states that “the parties must confer 
as soon as practicable.”164 The conference gives the parties an opportunity to 
formulate a discovery plan—a task of such importance that it cannot be 
overstated.165 A properly executed discovery plan eases the discovery process, 
decreases the tension between opposing counsels and advances the case forward 
to trial in an effective and efficient manner.166 
[46] Aside from being mandatory, formulating a discovery plan is helpful to 
every stage of pretrial litigation.167 A discovery plan must state:  
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or 
requirement for disclosures under Rule 26(a), including a 
statement of when initial disclosures were made or will be made; 
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when 
discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be 
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused on particular 
issues; (C) any issues about disclosure or discovery of 
 
                                                                                                                                     
162 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (2006). 
163 See generally id.  
164 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).  
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electronically stored information, including the form or forms in 
which it should be produced; (D) any issues about claims of 
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, including -- 
if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after 
production -- whether to ask the court to include their agreement in 
an order; (E) what changes should be made in the limitations on 
discovery imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what 
other limitations should be imposed; and (F) any other orders that 
the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or under Rule 16(b) and 
(c).168 
Essentially, the rule makers are trying to simplify the formulation of a discovery 
plan for counsel. Where the parties agree on the timing, scope, and form of 
disclosures, discovery disputes are less likely to ensue.169 And with a discovery 
plan, any such disputes should be easier to resolve.170 
[47] The “meet and confer” conference is a starting point for cooperation in 
discovery.171 At the conference, the parties should agree to the scope of discovery, 
a sampling protocol for search terms, any claw back or privilege agreements, and 
means of ensuring that any litigation holds are in place and being properly 
followed.172 After the conference, the parties may submit their agreement to the 
court as a proposed order.173 Completing these steps will significantly reduce the 
risk of discovery disputes and encourages moving the case forward to trial to 
attain a decision on the merits of the case.174  
[48] But, it is not likely that a single meeting will provide enough time to get 
everything resolved. Whenever possible, the parties should have multiple meet 
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and confer conferences. Moreover, holding multiple conferences promotes a 
continuous and open dialog between the parties and encourages the resolution of 
disputes without resorting to discovery motions and sanctions.175 During 
subsequent conferences, trial counsel should be heavily involved in determining 
the kinds of documents that will be used as evidence; the viability of any privilege 
claims, potential claims or defenses; and the availability of evidence related to 
such claims or defenses.176 
B.  Document Review: It Only Needs To Be Reasonable, Not Perfect 
[49] In Brown v. Allen,177 the Supreme Court noted: “He who must search a 
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not 
worth the search.”178 Although the Brown opinion has since been overruled by 
statute,179 its lesson remains applicable to e-discovery. Counsel cannot review all 
electronically stored information, nor should it.180 The standard for success in a 
document review is reasonableness, not perfection.181 A reasonable document 
 
                                                                                                                                     
175 See id. (“Some of the issues that parties should seek to resolve early in an action include: (i) the 
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review, therefore, should consist of (i) using searches to identify potentially 
relevant documents; and (ii) reviewing a random sample of those documents.182 
1.  Identifying Key Documents 
[50] While some document reviews are considered small (like the one in 
Swofford),183 other document productions involve billions or trillions of 
documents.184 Counsel should have an idea of the size of a requested production. 
With the amount of production ranging from megabytes to 
terabytes, counsel and document reviewers cannot be expected to 
sift through all electronically stored information. However, with an 
understanding of a company’s document retention program, the 
program’s size, and the personnel responsible for the program’s 
implementation, counsel and document reviewers can identify 
appropriate search terms, discuss projects with outside vendors, 
and budget accordingly.185 
Identifying key documents requires counsel to understand what information has 
been requested. To readily retrieve relevant documents when requested, counsel 
should be familiar with where documents are stored.  
2.  Search Terms 
[51] A discussion of every search term method is beyond the scope of this 
article. There are two methods, however, that will briefly be explained here to 
demonstrate the ability of ESI counsel and vendors across the country. Those 
methods are keyword searches and concept searches. A keyword search involves 
using simple words or phrases to find documents containing those words or 
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phrases.186 A concept search, by contrast, uses semantic word relationships to 
retrieve all documents pertaining to a particular subject.187 
[52] Keyword searches, by themselves, are disfavored and possibly 
indefensible because they require a manual review rather than using statistical 
sampling.188 In a 1985 study, a team of attorneys and paralegals compiled a list of 
keyword searches that they asserted would retrieve 75% of all relevant 
documents. But it was later determined that the keyword searches only retrieved 
20% of all relevant documents.189 The study found that the nature of the human 
language renders keyword searches highly ineffective, especially where people 
use different language or lexicons to describe a particular event.190 The results 
imply that keyword searches are not an effective means to find relevant 
information.191 Mathematical formulas that use metrics are being developed to 
improve both access to and retrieval of relevant information.192 Using such 
formulas will allow for a more transparent system of what words were pursued 
and what words produced false positives or negative results. 
[53] But even when the parameters are clear, challenging opposing counsel’s 
search terms is an uphill battle that is usually not worth fighting. In United States 
v. O’Keefe,193 the defendants challenged the keyword search terms used by the 
government.194 The district court held that a party contending that search terms 
are insufficient “will have to specifically so contend in a motion to compel and 
their contention must be based on evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 
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702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”195 The O’Keefe court reasoned that 
“[g]iven this complexity, for lawyers and judges to dare opine that certain search 
terms or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that 
were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.”196  
[54] Similarly, in Equity Analysis, LLC v. Analytics,197 the plaintiff sought 
discovery of documents on the defendant’s home computer.198 As the computer 
contained personal, private, and privileged information, the plaintiff proposed 
using keyword searches to limit the search to relevant information.199 Citing 
O’Keefe, the Equity Analysis court noted that the use of search terms is “beyond 
the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) and requires expert testimony. . . .”200 
The court therefore noted: 
Determining the significance of the loading of a new operating 
system upon file structure and retention and why the completed 
forensic search will yield information that will not be yielded by a 
search limited by file types or keywords are beyond any experience 
or knowledge I can claim. . . . Accordingly, I am going to require 
Equity to submit an affidavit from its examiner explaining why the 
limitations proposed by the plaintiff are unlikely to capture all the 
information Equity seeks and the impact, if any, of the loading of 
the new operating system upon Lundin’s computer and the data 
that was on it before the new operating system was loaded.201 
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The Equity Analytics court held that, with knowledge of the information, it could 
balance the plaintiff’s need to discover the information against the defendant’s 
privacy concerns.202 
3.  Sampling 
[55] Among other benefits, sampling can improve the efficiency of 
preservation and production throughout the e-discovery process.203 Specifically, 
sampling is a primary method of defending whether or not the production was 
reasonable, and it is also endorsed by Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.204 Sampling can “narrow the burden of searching voluminous 
electronically stored information”205 and can help determine whether further 
funds should be expended exploring other inaccessible sources, such as backup 
tapes or deleted data.206 For instance, sampling has been used to allow parties to 
test the validity of a 568 page privilege log207 and to determine whether three 
years of backup tapes were likely to contain relevant information.208  
[56] But it is far too simplistic to suggest that sampling is “good.” Like a 
document retention program, sampling must be done correctly or not at all.209 
Where sampling is conducted improperly, the results cannot be extrapolated 
because doing so would produce unreliable results.210 In particular, a party must 
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establish that a sample is random, within acceptable margins of error, yet large 
enough to reflect the views of the population.211 
[57] A sample is merely a snap shot of where a small representative group of 
the population stands on a particular issue.212 A sample must be random to be 
reliable.213 If the sample is not random, then the results are not truly 
representative of the population.214 Furthermore, before conducting the sample, 
one must decide how confident they would like to be that the sample data can 
effectively be extrapolated to the entire population.215 In most cases, 95 percent is 
an acceptable level of confidence.216 Based on the confidence level selected, one 
may then determine the requisite sample size.217 For example, suppose there is a 
population of 500 homes. At a 95 percent confidence level, you want to determine 
the number of homes with termite infestations.218 To obtain results with a margin 
of error of 10 percent of homes, you would have to randomly sample 81 homes.219 
Failure to determine the appropriate sample size, whether in reviewing documents 
or checking houses for termite infestations, might result in sanctions under Rule 
26(g) for not making a reasonable inquiry into the accuracy of one’s responses to 
discovery requests.220 Therefore, in the absence of an agreement to rely on 
 
                                                                                                                                     
211 Working Group on Best Practices for Document Retention and Prod., The Sedona Conference, 
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Achieving Quality in the E-Discovery Process, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 299, 327 (2009) [hereinafter Achieving Quality]., 
212 See id.  
213 Id.  
214 See id.  
215 See Bartlett, supra note 210, at 43. 
216 Id. at 45. 
217 See generally Raosoft, Sample Size Calculator, http://www raosoft.com/samplesize.html (last 
visited May 15, 2010).  
218 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 232, at 327–28.  
219 See generally id. Raosoft, supra note 217.  
220 Achieving Quality, supra note 211, at 303; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).  
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology Vol. XVI, Issue 4 
30 
“judgmental” sampling, sampling requires scrupulous planning before discovery 
begins.221 
[58] As applied to electronic discovery, sampling is commonly used to find 
relevant and responsive documents. But performing its mathematical calculations 
is complex and sophisticated.222 Counsel should understand that there are ways to 
ensure the search terms recall and precision.223 These metrics can be used to 
challenge or support a sampling protocol by showing the existence or absence of a 
bias or error. 
C.  Form of Production 
[59] Unless a party agreement or court order provides otherwise, parties should 
preserve information in the form in which it is maintained in the ordinary course 
of business.224 Further, where a party has produced information in one form, 
courts typically will not require production of the same information in another 
form.225 Therefore, at some point, the ESI counsel and trial counsel should decide 
how to best preserve and produce the documents. 
[60] Some individuals want everything in paper form. This is impractical and 
illogical in this day and age. The days of storing everything in a warehouse are all 
but over. The space and the costs associated with physical storage are almost 
prohibitive.226 Today, one can easily scan documents onto a computer and store 
 
                                                                                                                                     
221 Achieving Quality, supra note 211, at 310 (stating that when judgment sampling, counsel is not 
expecting his/her results to be statistically accurate but is merely trying to show that his/her 
judgment is correct).  
222 Roland Bernier, Avoiding an E-Discovery Odyssey, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 499 (2009). 
223 Id. at 502–03. Precision is the percentage of relevant versus non relevant documents that are 
retrieved by the search. Id. at 502. For example, if 40 documents were relevant and forty were not 
relevant, the precision of the search would be 50%. See id. (The author uses slightly more 
simplistic numbers; however, the principle expressed is consistent with that of the author.). Recall 
on the other hand measures relevant documents retrieved against the total relevant documents. Id. 
If there were 80 documents total, and the key word search revealed 40 relevant documents, then 
the recall would be fourth divided by 80, or 50%. See id.  
224 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 60 princ. 12.  
225 Id. at 66 cmt. 12.d.  
226 See Achieving Quality, supra note 211, at 315. 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology Vol. XVI, Issue 4 
31 
those documents on a thumb drive.227 By doing so, ESI or in-house counsel can 
sample and search the data and print out any important information, thus creating 
fewer paper records and causing fewer space problems.228 
IV.  COOPERATION 
[61] The Sedona Conference has gained widespread acceptance in its quest for 
cooperation in discovery, including the recognition of United States Supreme 
Court Justice Breyer.229 The Sedona Conference argues that discovery should not 
“be a place for extended argument and advocacy.”230 Instead, the parties should 
cooperate during discovery, saving arguments and advocacy for later stages of 
litigation.231 Furthermore, counsel should cooperate not only with opposing 
counsel, but also with other members of his litigation team.232 
CONCLUSION 
[62] Although courts have reviewed numerous discovery violations, the 
Swofford court was probably the first to sanction in-house counsel.233 Swofford 
lifted the veil. Counsel of record are no longer the only lawyers potentially liable 
for discovery abuses.234 Going forward, there is likely to be a major shift in who 
manages electronic documents. ESI counsel might be charged with significantly 
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more work, including the formulation of document retention programs and 
litigation hold procedures.235 To avoid sanctions in the wake of Swofford v. 
Eslinger, in-house and ESI counsel must not only be involved in the discovery 
process, but in assisting with the implementation of any document retention 
program and ensuring compliance with any litigation holds.236 
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